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The Export Administration Act of 1979:
An Examination of Foreign Availability
of Controlled Goods and Technologies
The Export Administration Act of 19791 amended thirty years of

legislative controls over the export of advanced technology2 to the Soviet Union and other non-market economy countries.' Since first enacted, these post-World War II export controls attempted to reconcile

the conflicting objectives of protecting national security while promoting United States international trade.4 Nonetheless, the increasing

availability of advanced goods and technologies from foreign sources
to communist nations has undermined both these objectives.' By the
1 Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976)).
2 National security controls restrict the export of "dual use" items, that is, goods and technologies with both civilian and military uses. See Bingham & Johnson, A RationalApproachto Export Controls, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 894, 899 (1979), reprintedin U.S. Export Control Policy and
Extension of the Export Administration Act, Part III-Oversight to Review U.S. Export Control
Policy and Proposals to Extend and Revise the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amendedHearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
49 (1979).
3 The Export Administration Amendments of 1977 eliminate the communist status of a country as the exclusive basis for imposing export controls as follows:
In administering export controls for national security purposes as prescribed in section
3(2)(C) of this Act, United States policy toward individual countries shall not be determined
exclusively on the basis of a country's Communist or non-Communist status but shall take
into account such factors as the country's present and potential relationship in the United
States, its present and potential relationship to countries friendly or hostile to the United
States, its ability and willingness to control retransfers of United States exports in accordance
with United States policy, and such other factors as the President may deem appropriate.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72 §
5(b), 93 Stat. 503, 507 (1979)). The 1979 Act similarly defines countries subject to national security controls.
The 1979 Act focuses on three major issues: national security controls, foreign policy purposes and short supply. This comment will focus solely on national security controls. See Extension and Revision of the Export AdminWration Act of 1969: Hearings and Markup before the
Subcomr. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House Comrm on Foreign Affairs,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (statement of Stanley J. Marcuss, Senior Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Industry
and Trade, Dep't of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
4 For a discussion of these issues, see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTrrE, LEGISLATIVE
ANALYSIS, PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF EXPORT CONTROLS FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY (1979)
[hereinafter cited as AEI].
5 As the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Afairs reported: "Obviously, the
usefulness of export controls in national security cases is substantially vitiated to the extent the
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late 1970's, Congress was confronted with alarming military and technological developments by communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union,6 and substantial U. S. trade deficits.7
More than any of its predecessors, the 1979 Act recognizes the impact of foreign availability on United States export control in two primary ways. First, it requires a more thorough assessment of the foreign
availability of comparable goods and technologies during the licensing
process.' Second, it authorizes both mandatory and discretionary negotiations with foreign countries toward the control and reduction of
foreign availability.'
The eventual reduction of unwarranted export controls requires
that foreign availability be realistically appraised. Toward this objective, the 1979 Act provides for more centralized and comprehensive
foreign availability determinations within the licensing process than
that afforded by previous legislation. The Act further authorizes the
Secretary of Commerce to develop procedures and criteria for the continual review of the foreign availability of controlled goods.' 0 Nonetheless, the strict legislative standards and procedures for assessing
foreign availability may realistically translate into only limited benefits
to United States international trade.
Ultimately, the control and reduction of foreign availability
through negotiations with foreign governments and within multilateral
forums will determine the effectiveness of national security controls.
Particularly, the statute authorizes the United States to enter negotiations with members of the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative
Group on Export Controls (COCOM) to reduce export controls and
develop effective enforcement procedures. 1 ' The success of COCOM
negotiations and the continued vitality of the COCOM forum require
country in question can obtain comparable goods or technologies from a country other than the
United States." S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
6 See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 46 (statement of Marshall I. Goldman, Professor of
Economics, Wellesley College, and Associate Director, Russian Research Center, Harvard Uni-

versity).
7 The United States has an annual commodities foreign trade deficit of $30 billion. Id. at 7
(statement of Hon. Dean Rusk, Professor of International Law, University of Georgia School of
Law, and former Secretary of State).
8 See text accompanying notes 45-62 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 63-67 infra.
10 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §

2404).
11 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(i), 93 Stat. 503, 512 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404).
COCOM is an informal multilateral organization established to regulate the export of advanced
goods and technologies to communist countries. For a more comprehensive discussion, see text

accompanying notes 35-44, 68-87 infra.
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the United States to adopt international trade policies and internal licensing procedures suitable to the COCOM framework. The 1979 Act
specifically fails to develop adequate internal licensing procedures necessary to assure continued cooperative multilateral export controls.
This comment will first delineate the legislative history of the original Export Control Act of 1949 and subsequent legislation in order to
trace the development of foreign availability concerns in export control
legislation. Second, it will examine the concurrent development of
COCOM as an instrumentality for effectuating multilateral export controls. Next, this comment will describe the new statutory scheme for
determining foreign availability in the export licensing process.
Fourth, it will examine the 1979 provisions authorizing bilateral and
mutilateral negotiations aimed at controlling and reducing foreign
availability. Fifth, it will describe current COCOM efforts to multilaterally control the exportation of goods and technologies and the deficiencies in United States and member countries' participation. Finally,
this comment will assess the effects and implications of the new legislation on United States international trade and United States efforts to
both unilaterally and multilaterally control the exportation of goods
and technologies.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF

1949

AND

SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS

Prior to World War II, the United States government limited export controls to wartime or other emergency circumstances. 12 These
controls were primarily intended to protect scarce resources and restrict
13
the export of war-related materiel and other products to non-allies.
During the years 1945-47, the government continued to control exports on a yearly basis despite the relaxation of other wartime controls. 14 Export controls were continued for three primary reasons.
First, the United States faced critical supply shortages. The lack of
15
controls would have both exhausted goods and inflated their prices.
12

For a discussion of the history of wartime export controls, see Berman & Garson, United

States Export Controls-Past,Presentand Future, 67 COLIUM. L. REV. 791 (1967).
13 See Id. at 791-92; AEI, supra note 4, at 4.
14 Section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 508, 54 Stat. 712, as amended by the Act of June 30,
1942, ch. 461, 56 Stat. 463, was extended to June 30, 1946 (Act of June 30, 1945, cl. 205, 59 Stat.
270), June 30, 1947 (Act of May 23, 1946, ch. 269, 60 Stat. 215), and July 15, 1947 (S.J. Res. 139,
ch. 184, 61 Stat. 214 (1947)). See also Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 791-92.
15 Berman & Garson, supranote 12, at 794. The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
reported: "Export controls were retained after the war to reduce the inflationary effect of abnormal foreign demands on our supplies." S. REP. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
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Second, United States postwar aid to European countries required the

establishment of priorities in exporting particular goods to particular
countries. 1 6 Finally, United States security required restraint in exportsignificance to the
ing industrial materials which might have military
17
Soviet Union and other communist countries.

By 1948, postwar production eliminated most shortages. In light
of the perceived military threat of the Soviet Union, the protection of
national security became the primary purpose of export controls.1 8 In
March 1948, the Commerce Department placed most exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under mandatory licensing.' 9 Congress

also amended the pending Marshall Plan bill, restricting the export of
items to be delivered by participating to nonparticipating countries
based on national security grounds.20

In 1949, Congress enacted the Export Control Act.2 The Act declared that the control of goods was necessary to protect the domestic
economy from the drain of scarce materials and the inflationary impact

of foreign demand, to further foreign policy, and to protect national
security. 22 To effectuate these policies, the Act granted the President
the authority to prohibit or curtail exportation of any goods and technologies by establishing rules and regulations to delegate such power

and descretion to government departments "as he may deem appropriate." 23
16 Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 795.
17 Id.
18 In 1969, Rep. Thomas Ashley stated:
At that time Western Europe, still economically weak from the ravages of the Second World
War, appeared to the Congress to be in realistic danger of attack from the monolithic SinoSoviet bloc under the leadership of Stalin, and it was further believed, comparing our industrial might with both Eastern and Western Europe at that time, that goods withheld from the
Soviets by means of controls on American commodities could not elsewhere be obtained.
H.R. REP. No. 524, 91st Cong., IstSess. 9 (1969). See also S. REP. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1949); AEI, supra note 4, at 4; Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 795.
19 13 Fed. Reg. 1120 (1948).
20 Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, ch. 169 § 117(d), 62 Stat. 137, 154 (1948).
21 Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72,
93 Stat. 503-36 (1979) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2419)).
22 Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, § 2, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (current version at Pub. L. No. 9672 § 3, 93 Stat. 503, 504-05 (1979) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402)).
23 Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, §§ 3(a), 3(b), 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (current version at Pub.
L. No. 96-72, § 4(e). 93 Stat. 503, 506 (1979) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403)).
The Act was originally intended as a temporary measure. It was renewed in 1951, 1953, 1960,
1962, and in 1965, when it was amended and extended for an additional four years. Joint Resolution of May 16, 1951, ch. 83, 65 Stat. 43; Act of June 16, 1953, ch. 116, 67 Stat. 62; Act of June 29,
1956, ch. 473, § 1, 70 Stat. 407; Act of June 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-466, 72 Stat. 220; Act of May
13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 80-464, 74 Stat. 130; Act of July 1, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-515 § 1, 76 Stat.
172; Act of June 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-63, 79 Stat. 209. See also, Berman & Garson, supra note

Export Administration Act of 1979
2:179(1980)

Twenty years later, Congress enacted the Export Administration

Act of 1969,24 which liberalized United States trade policies. Congress
recognized that unwarranted restrictions on United States and allied

trade in light of Soviet technological and military development harmed
both United States exporting and international relations. 25 The expressed policies of the 1969 Act included: (1) encouraging trade with
countries that shared diplomatic and trade relations with the United

States; (2) restricting the exports of goods and technologies which
would significantly contribute to military potential of any other nation

and threaten national security;2 6 (3) formulating and applying any nec-

essary controls to the maximum extent possible in cooperation with all
nations; and (4) formulating a unified, multilateral trade control pol27

icy.

The 1969 Act continued to grant the President broad and ultimate
discretion in regulating exports.2" The Act authorized the President to
prohibit the exportation of goods and technologies that were detrimental to United States security, "regardlessof their availability" from na-

tions threatening the national security of the United States.29
It was not until 1977 that the President's broad discretion to regu30
late exports was theoretically limited by foreign availability concerns.
The 1977 Amendments prohibited the President from imposing export
controls on goods and technologies available without restriction and in
12, at 792; H.R. REP. No. 524, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969) (statement of Rep. Thomas L.
Ashley).
24 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2413 (1976) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503-36 (1979)
(to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2419)).
25 Rep. Thomas Ashley stated:
From the standpoint of our national security and the conduct of our foreign affairs, which, of
course, remain paramount in our consideration of export controls, as well as from the vantage
point of domestic economic considerations, we have moved into a period into which the Congress should maintain a close, in-depth review of our export control laws with a view to
reshaping them in light of potential, economic and technological changes taking place in
Western Europe, Japan, and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe.
H. RL REP. No. 524, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
26 50 U.S.C. § 2402(1) (1976) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 3, 93 Stat. 503, 504-05
(1979) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402)).
27 Id. at § 2402(3).
28 See Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 792. See also Note, Export Controls-A National
Security Standard, 12 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 92, 93-94 (1971) [hereinafter cited as VA. Note].
29 50 U.S.C. § 2403(b)(1) (1976) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(0(2), 93 Stat. 503,
509 (1979) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §. 2404)) (emphasis supplied).
30 Export Administration Amendments of 1977,50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976 & Supp. I
1977) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2419)). Failure to adequately consider foreign availability in prior legislation was regarded as "one of the most serious flaws" in the export licensing process. H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1977).
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comparable quantities and qualities from foreign countries, unless he
determined that the absence of controls would be detrimental to national security. 1 When export controls were imposed notwithstanding
foreign availability, the Amendments authorized the President to initiate negotiations with appropriate foreign countries to eliminate such
availability.3 2 The Amendments further required the President to submit a special report to Congress assessing the effectiveness of multilateral controls, specifically the COCOM forum, and to formulate specific
proposals to increase the effectiveness of such controls.33 Finally, the
Amendments authorized the Secretary of Commerce to review goods
subject to unilateral and multilateral controls in light of several factors
including foreign availability. 4
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF COCOM

United States export control policy was initially premised upon
multilateral controls to restrict both the export of goods and technologies from foreign sources and the transshipment of American goods.35
The United States recognized that the effective inhibition of Soviet military and technological development required other major industrialized countries to adopt similar export controls. 6
In November 1949, the United States and six major allies established a multinational Consultative Group on Export Controls to curtail Soviet development.37 The coordinating committee, COCOM,
established in 1950, eventually assumed full responsibility for coordi31 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72, §
5(f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404)).
32 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1976 & Supp. I 1977) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72, §
5(f)(4), 93 Stat 503, 510 (1979)).
33 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409 (1976 & Supp. 11977) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 14, 93
Stat. 503, 532-33 (1979)).
34 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(c) (1976 & Supp. 11977) (current version at Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 4,
93 Stat. 503-05 (1979)). The 1972 amendments also had authorized the President to remove unilateral controls from goods which he determined to be "available without restriction from sources
outside the United States in significant quantity and comparable in quality" unless he determined
that the absence of controls would prove detrimental to national security. Pub. L. No. 92-412, §
104(a)(2), 86 Stat. 644 (1972).
35 See AEI, supra note 4, at 4; Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 834.
36 COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, EXPORT CONTROLS: NEED TO CLARIFY POLICY AND SIMPLIFY ADMINISTRATION 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
EXPORT CONTROLS].

37 See AEI, supra note 4, at 4; Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 834-35. The six allies
included the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In
1952 and 1953, the membership expanded to include Norway, Denmark, Canada, and the Federal
Republic of Germany, and subsequently, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Japan. The fifteen member organization now includes Japan and all the NATO countries, except Iceland.
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nating multilateral export controls. 38
The Consultative Group established four secret lists of controls.3 9
In 1954 and 1958, major reductions were made in the lists, and, by
1958, two sublists were maintained by COCOM: items embargoed and
items under surveillance.40 The current COCOM embargo list contains
105 item categories.4" The United States unilaterally controls exports
of an additional thirty-eight industrial item categories. 4 2
COCOM members have agreed to embargo goods and technologies in three categories: (1) those principally used for the development,

production, or use of arms; (2) those from which technology of military
significance may be extracted; and (3) those of military significance in
which the intended destinations have deficient supply.43 The purpose
of the COCOM embargo is to restrict the exports of goods and technologies which increase the military capabilities of the communist countries, thereby threatening the security of member countries.'
THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF

1979 AND THE

DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN AVAILABILITY

The effectiveness of United States export controls for national security purposes is limited by the free availability of comparable goods
and technologies from foreign sources.4 5 The 1979 Act more effectively
38 The Consultative Group created two committees: (1) the Coordinating Committee
(COCOM), established in 1950, which dealt with trade with Eastern Europe; and (2) the China
Committee (CHINCOM), established in 1952, which dealt with trade with Communist China. In
1957, CHINCOM was disbanded and COCOM controls were extended to Communist China,
North Korea, and North Vietnam. Following France's military withdrawal from NATO, and the
refusal to appoint a new chairman, the Consultative Group ceased its existence. COCOM, therefore, subsequently assumed full responsibility for coordinating multilateral export controls. See
EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 36, at 7; Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 834-35.
Information on COCOM is limited because of the secrecy which surrounds COCOM and
COCOM agreements. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
39 The four secret lists were: (1) items totally embargoed; (2) items granted quotas; (3) items
under surveillance; and (4) items to be denied to China and North Korea. See Berman & Garson,
supra note 12, at 835. See also 2 S. METZGER, LAW OF INTERN'ATIONAL TRADE 1063-66 (1966).
40 Special Report on MultilateralExport Controls,submitted by the PresidentPursuantto Section 117 ofthe ExportAdministrationAmendments of 1977 in Export AdministrationAct: Agenda
for Refom Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on InternationalPolicy and Trade ofthe House Comm
on InternationalRelations,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SpecialReport]. See
also Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 835-36. By 1958, less than 200 items were listed by
COCOM, comprising 10% of all items involved in international trade. VA. Note, supra note 28, at
102 n. 66.
41 EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 36, at iii.
42 Id.
43 Bingham & Johnson, supra note 2, at 904.
44 SpecialReport, supra note 40, at 52.
45 Bingham & Johnson, supra note 2, at 903.
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incorporates the assessment of foreign availability into the export li-

censing process than any prior legislation.46 Basically, the Act provides
that the President shall not impose export controls for national security
purposes on goods or technology which he determines are available

without restriction from foreign sources in significant quantity and
comparable in quality to those produced in the United States, unless he
determines that adequate evidence demonstrates that the absence of
controls would prove detrimental to national security.47 Furthermore,
the President may delegate his power and authority to government de-

partments or agencies as he deems appropriate, except as such delegations act to overrule or modify recommendations or decisions made by
the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, or State, pursuant to the Act.4 8
The Act specifically authorizes the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other departments, to exercise national security controls. 49 Under the Act, the Secretary of
Commerce may require any of four types of export licenses for the exportation of goods and technologies to controlled countries: (1) a vali-

dated license, authorizing a specific export, issued pursuant to an
application by the exporter; (2) a qualified general license, authorizing

multiple exports, issued pursuant to an application by the exporter; (3)
a general license, authorizing exports without application by the exporter; and (4) such other licenses as may be effective in implementing
the Act.50
The 1979 Act requires the Secretary, in consultation with appro-

priate government agencies and technological advisory committees, to
review on a continuing basis the foreign availability of goods and technologies subject to validated license controls."1

Section 5(f)(1) ex-

46 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503-36 (1979) (amending 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976)).
47 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 4(c), 93 Stat. 503, 506 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403).
48 Id. at § 4(e).
49 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(a), 93 Stat. 503, 506 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404).
50 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 4(a), 93 Stat. 503, 505-06 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403).
51 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404).
Under § 5(e)(2), the Secretary shall require a validated license ift
(A) the export of such goods or technology is restricted pursuant to a multilateral agreement, formal or informal, to which the United States is a party and, under the terms of such
multilateral agreement, such exports require the specific approval of the parties to such multilateral agreement;
(B) with respect to such goods or technology, other nations do not possess capabilities comparable to those possessed by the United States;
(C) the United States is seeking the agreement of other suppliers to apply comparable controls to such goods or technology and, in the judgment of the Secretary, United States export

Export AdministrationAct of 1979
2:179(1980)

pressly authorizes the Secretary to establish by regulation the
procedures
and criteria by which foreign availability is to be determined.5 2 If the Secretary determines that the goods or technology
"are

available in fact... in sufficient quantity and of sufficient quality" to
render validated licenses ineffective, he may not require such controls
unless the President determines that their absence will be detrimental

to national security.53 When the President determines that export controls shall be maintained, notwithstanding foreign availability, the Secretary is required to publish the basis of the determination and the
estimated economic impact of the decision.54

The legislation also authorizes the Secretary to approve any application for a validated license which meets all other requirements if the
goods or technologies will be available in fact and in sufficient quantity
and of sufficient quality from foreign sources." When the Secretary
determines that such goods or technologies are available from foreign

sources he must also determine whether an additional determination of
foreign availability to remove validated controls pursuant to section 5
(f)Q) is warranted.5 6
Furthermore, section 5(f)(3) requires that any determination of

foreign availability which is the basis of a decision to grant a license or
remove validated controls on the export of goods or technologies shall
be made in writing and supported by reliable evidence, including scientific or physical examination and expert opinion based upon adequate
factual or intelligence information.57 The Act precludes the use of un-

corroborated and self-serving representations by applicants as the sole
basis for approving or denying a license.58
In order to gather foreign availability information, section 5(f)(5)
authorizes the Secretary to establish within the Office of Export Ad-

ministration of the Department of Commerce, "a capability to monitor
controls on such goods or technology, by means of such license, are necessary pending the
conclusion of such agreement.
Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(e)(2), 93 Stat. 503, 508-09 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404).
52 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404). For a discussion of Department of Defense procedures in assessing foreign availability for
the update of export control lists, see House Hearings, supra note 3, at 166 (statement of Ellen J.
Frost, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of Int'l Economic Affairs, Dep't of Defense).
53 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5 (f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at § 5 (0(2).
57 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(3), 93 Stat. 503, 509-10 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404).
58 Id.
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and gather information" on the foreign availability of goods and technologies subject to control.5 9 Section 5(f)(6) orders each government
department, subject to the protection of intelligence sources and procedures, to furnish information on foreign availability to the Office of
Export Administration and permits the Office to furnish appropriate
foreign availability information to various departments. 60 Finally, section 5(h) authorizes the Secretary, upon written request of industry representatives, to appoint technical advisory committees comprised of
industry and government representatives to evaluate technical matters
61
on specified goods and technologies, including foreign availability.
Specifically, section 5(h)(6) provides that whenever a technical advisory
committee documents that foreign availability, in fact, has rendered
validated license controls ineffective, the Secretary shall investigate
such availability. If foreign availability is verified, the Secretary shall
remove validated controls unless the President determines that their
62
absence would be detrimental to national security.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS DESIGNED TO CONTROL AND REDUCE

FOREIGN AVAILABILITY

The United States capability to inhibit technological and military
development of communist countries is severely limited by the availability of comparable goods and technologies from foreign sources. Indeed, the House Committee Report on Foreign Affairs noted that
"[w]ith the increasing ability of other high technology producers to
compete with the United States in the world market, the ability of the
to the comUnited States unilaterally to deny goods and technologies
63
munist countries is increasingly being eroded.
Effective national security controls require, at the least, a legislative scheme to control and reduce the foreign availability of advanced
technologies. The 1979 Act provides for both mandatory and discretionary negotiations by the President with governments of foreign
countries. Section 5(f)(4) directs the President to initiate negotiations
with appropriate foreign governments to reduce foreign availability in
any case in which United States export controls are imposed notwith59 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(5), 93 Stat. 503, 510 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404).
60 Id. at § 5(0(6).
61 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(h), 93 Stat. 503, 510-11 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404).
62 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(h)(6), 93 Stat. 503, 511 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404).
63 H.R. REP. No. 200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1979).
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standing foreign availability.64 The President must initiate negotiations
whenever he has reason to believe that goods or technologies may become available from foreign sources and that availability can be prevented with negotiations.6 The latter provision authorizes presidential
discretion both in the assessment of foreign availability and in the per-

ceived effectiveness of negotiations.66
The 1979 Act also specifically mandates the President to enter into

negotiations with COCOM members to accomplish four major objectives: (1) publication of the list of items controlled for export by agreement of COCOM, together with all notes, understandings, and changes

to the agreement; (2) holding of periodic meetings with high level representatives of COCOM countries' governments to discuss and develop
64 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(4), 93 Stat. 503, 510 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404).
65 Id.

66 Proponents of tighter export controls have advocated reducing the President's discretion to
initiate negotiations. See 125 CONG. REc. H7661 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Rep.
Wolff). In addition, a Senate ammendment, sponsored by Senators Stevenson and Heinz, would
have required the President to recommend to Congress appropriate measures for the elimination
of foreign availability when Onegotiations failed. 125 CONG. REc. S 10,154-55 (daily ed. July 21,
1979). In deleting this provision, the conference committee noted that the President may still
invoke his existing authority when negotiations fail. H.R. REP. No. 482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47
(1979).
In addition, trade and other economic sanctions were proposed against foreign countries
which failed to curb the availability of goods. 125 CONG. REc. SIO,151-52 (daily ed. July 21,
1979). Such sanctions, however, would aid foreign competitors and, more specifically, jeopardize
U.S. relations with cooperative countries, particularly COCOM members. See 125 CONG. REC.
S10,173 (daily ed. July 21, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
It is further doubtful that economic sanctions against United States allies would be effective.
In 1951, Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act) in order to
induce greater cooperation in the export of arms from friendly countries. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-13d
(1976). The Act primarily restricted the granting of military, economic, or financial assistance to
free countries that exported implements of war to any nation threatening the security of the
United States. These sanctions were effective only as long as U.S. assistance was more important
and profitable to these countries than was trade with the East. This is no longer true today.
Berman & Garson, supra note 12, at 838; Bingham & Johnson, supra note 2, at 903. See also note
104 infra.
The Battle Act administrator was responsible for cooperating and negotiating with COCOM
countries; COCOM provided the principal means of implementing the Battle Act. The Export
Administration Act of 1979, however, superseded the Battle Act. Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 17(e), 93
Stat. 503, 534 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2416). Section 5(k) provides that the
Secretary of State, in consultation with other appropriate departments and agencies, shall be responsible for conducting negotiations with other countries. Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(k), 93 Stat.
503, 512 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404). This section grants the Secretary of
State the authority to act as administrator for U.S. participation in COCOM. S. REP. No. 169,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1979). This provision is also directed toward countries outside
COCOM. There are indications, however, that technologically advanced countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Israel follow COCOM guidelines although they do not participate in
COCOM. AVIATiON WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 10, 1979, at 26.
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export control policy; (3) reduction of the scope of export controls to a
level acceptable to and enforceable by all member governments; and
(4) development of more effective enforcement procedures.6 7
MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL AND REDUCE FOREIGN
AVAILABILITY

COCOM methods of export control include: detailed embargo

lists, procedures for reviewing individual exceptions to the embargo,
and procedures for multilateral review of these lists. 68 Under

COCOM, a member government may petition other members to exempt one-time sales by a domestic exporter from multilateral restrictions. Requests are reviewed by members who recommend full or
partial approval or denial to COCOM, which then issues an advisory
opinion to the submitting government.6 9 COCOM rules provide for a
decision to be made within eighteen days after it is submitted to

COCOM, with an automatic two-week extension if no decision has
been reached in the initial period. Additional weekly extensions are
available at the discretion of the submitting government.
The United States has adhered to the COCOM deadlines for
processing exception requests less frequently than any other member.7 0
The administration of exception requests within United States govern-

ment agencies, substantially identical to that for export license applications, is ill-suited to meet COCOM deadlines.7 1 United States officials
have contended, however, that other countries rely on the United States
to perform thorough reviews. This reliance increases U.S. response
time and complicates U.S. trade relations.72
Section 10(h) of the 1979 Act introduces a new scheme for process-

ing domestic exception requests that are required to be submitted for
67 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(i), 93 Stat. 503, 512 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404).
68 Special Report, supra note 40, at 52.
69 About 1,000 exception requests are reviewed annually by COCOM. COCOM disapproves
approximately 2 to 4% of the requests, 3 to 5% are withdrawn, and many more are revised based
upon recommendations during the review process. Id. at 53.
70 During the first six months of 1977, the United States decided only 41 of the 202 requests by
the first deadline and an additional 31 within the two week extension. The United States reserved
opinion on more requests and did so for longer periods of time than any other COCOM member.
EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 36, at 11-12.
71 As stated in the Comptroller General's report: "The elaborate U.S. review process isn't
designed to provide a response within the required timeframe;... some U.S. export control officials are not aware of these deadlines." Id. at 11.
72 In. some cases, however, U.S. licensing officials claimed that the initial requests contained
insufficient data and that submitting countries were slow to respond to U.S. requests for additional
information. Id. at 12.
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multilateral review. 73 If multilateral review is not completed within
sixty days, the Secretary must grant a license unless he determines that
issuance would prove detrimental to national security. The Secretary

must notify the applicant and Congress of the status of the application
following each additional sixty-day delay. The statute, therefore, only
specifies a target period and provides a loophole for continued delay.
Furthermore, the Act fails to include the entire House provision which

also proposed a sixty-day framework for U.S. review of other countries'
licensing exceptions required to be submitted for multilateral review.74
73

Section 10(h) states:

(h) MULTILATERAL CONTROLS-In any case in which an application, which has been
finally approved under subsection (c), (f), or (g) of this section, is required to be submitted to
a multilateral review process, pursuant to a multilateral agreement, formal or informal, to
which the United States is a party, the license shall not be issued as prescribed in such subsections, but the Secretary shall notify the applicant of the approval of the application (and the
date of such approval) by the Secretary subject to such multilateral review. The license shall
be issued upon approval of the application under such multilateral review. If such multilateral review has not resulted in a determination with respect to the application within 60 days
after such date, the Secretary's approval of the license shall be final and the license shall be
issued, unless the Secretary determines that issuance of the license would prove detrimental
to the national security of the United States. At the time at which the Secretary makes such a
determination, the Secretary shall notify the applicant of the determination and shall notify
the Congress of the determination, the reasons for the determination, the reasons for which
the multilateral review could not be concluded within such 60-day period, and the actions
planned or being taken by the United States Government to secure conclusion of the multilateral review. At the end of every 60-day period after such notification to Congress, the
Secretary shall advise the applicant and the Congress of the status of the application, and
shall report to Congress in detail on the reasons for the further delay and any further actions
being taken by the United States Government to secure conclusion of the multilateral review.
In addition, at the time at which the Secretary issues or denies the license upon conclusion of
the multilateral review, the Secretary shall notify the Congress of such issuance or denial and
of the total time required for the multilateral review.
Pub. L. No. 96-72 § 10(h), 93 Stat. 503, 529(1979)(to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410).
74 H.R. 4034, sponsored by Rep. Bingiam, required that multilateral review of U.S. goods be
completed within sixty days or a license be issued. Furthermore, H.R. 4034 specifically provided
for U.S. review of other countries' exception requests within sixty days, as follows:
In anycase in which the approvalofthe UnitedStates Government ir sought by aforeigngovernment for the export of goods or technology pursuant to a multilateralagreement,formal or
informal, to which the United States is aparty, the Secretary of State, after consulting with
other appropriate United States Government agencies, shall, within sixty days after the date
on which the request for such approval is made, make a determination with respect to the
request for approval. Any such other agency which does not submit a recommendation to the
Secretary of State before the end of such sixty-day period shall be deemed by the Secretary of
State to have no objection to the request for United States Government approval. The Secretary of State may not delegate the authority to disapprove a request for United States Government approval under this paragraph to any official of the Department of State holding a
rank lower than Deputy Assistant Secretary.
H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CoNG. Rnc. H3048 (daily ed. May 10, 1979) (emphasis
added).
The conference committee stated that it agreed to accept the House provision, which authorized a sixty-day time limit for multilateral review of U.S. licensing cases and for U.S. review of
other countries' licensingcases, with an amendment providing a national security waiver for the
sixty-day period and a notification period if a waiver is used. H. R. REP. No. 482, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 50 (1979). Nonetheless, the 1979 Act explicitly omits any provisions concerning the U.S.
review of other countries' licensing cases.
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Many COCOM exception requests submitted by other members
include goods or technologies subject to U.S. re-export licensing.75 The
United States is the only COCOM country to require that any U.S.
good or technology be relicensed each time it is further exported. This
review has created substantial delays in COCOM decisions.76 Furthermore, it damages U.S. exporting because foreign firms are seeking or
developing substitutes for U.S. components as a means of avoiding
these delays.77
The 1979 Act, however, fails to expressly eliminate the relicensing
procedure or provide specific procedural safeguards to meet COCOM
deadlines for processing exception requests. 78 Rather, the Act requires
that a license be issued or denied within ninety days of when the Secre75 More than one fourth of the COCOM exception requests in 1977 submitted by other members included goods or technologies subject to U.S. re-export licensing. EXPORT CONTROLS, supra
note 36, at 14; U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the Export AdministrationAct, Part P
Oversight to Review U.S. Export ControlPolicy and Proposalsto Extend and Revise the Export
AdministrationAct of 1969, as amended"HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking,Housing,
and UrbanAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) (statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General) [hereinafter cited as Export Control Oversight]. Applications for re-export are thus reviewed
twice: first, as a re-export licensing case, and second, as an exception request. See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 261-62 (statement of Kenneth Fasick, Director, Int'l Div., GAO), 1046 (recommendations of the Emergency Committee for American Trade).
76 EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 36, at 14-15; Export Control Oversight, supra note 75, at 10
(statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General).
77 EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 36, at 15.
78 The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs rejected an amendment to
Senate bill S. 737 that would have prohibited controls on the re-export of U.S. goods and technology from COCOM countries that control such exports in fact and to the same extent as the United
States. The Department of Defense objected to the removal of re-export controls:
First, it will be difficult to define exactly what "in fact" and "to the same extent" mean in
practice. Second, the export control practice of another country may not remain constant.
Yet under the proposed legislation we would have no legal remedy to respond to any lessening of such controls until exports damaging to our national security had already taken place.
S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979).
Furthermore, U.S. re-export controls imply distrust of COCOM members. Export Controls
Oversight, supra note 75, at 10 (statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General). In addition,
the Department of State proposed to substitute the exception request review for the re-export
licensing process. Id.
The 1979 Act does not mention the re-export licensing process. Section 5(e)(3), for example,
states that to the maximum extent practicable, the Secretary shall require a qualified general license authorizing multiple exports, in lieu of a validated license, if the export of such good is
restricted pursuant to a multilateral agreement and does not require the specific approval of the
parties. Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(e)(3), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404). This provision, however, fails to eliminate re-export licensing of goods subject to approval
by COCOM members. In fact, § 5(e)(2) states that the Secretary shall require a validated license,
authorizing a specific export, if such good is restricted pursuant to a multilateral agreement and
requires the specific approval of the parties. Id. at § 5(e)(2)(A).
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tary determines that referral to another agency is unnecessary. 9 When
the Secretary determines that such referral is necessary, a license must
be issued or denied within an additional ninety-day period. 80 The Secretary must resolve any conflicting recommendations during the additional period.8 ' This scheme thus sets a 180-day maximum time limit
for processing export applications.
COCOM members revise the international control list every two to
three years, with the most recent revision having been completed in
1976. Preparation of a new list began in June 1978, and was scheduled
for completion in the fall of 1979.82

The success of the latest revision ultimately may depend upon the
degree to which the new list and member countries incorporate the crit79 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 10(c), 93 Stat. 503, 525 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2409).
The 1977 amendments required the Secretary to grant a license that was not acted upon
within ninety days, unless a finding was made that additional time was necessary. 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403(g)(1) (1976 & Supp. 11977). The applicant thus had to be notified in writing of the specific
reasons for the delay and the estimated time of decision. Form letters, notifying applicants of the

post-ninety-day delay had been increasingly used, perhaps violating the spirit, but not the letter of
the law. Juanita Kreps, former Secretary of Commerce, testified that, in 1978, approximately 3.3%
of the total applications processes required more than ninety days. Export Controls Oversight,
supra note 75, at 34 (statement of Juanita Kreps). In 1977, of 57,850 applications filed, 1,032
exceeded the ninety-day limit. In 1978, of 63,476 applications filed, 1,988 exceeded the ninety-day
limit. During 1979, the total number of applications was expected to reach 77,000. AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 30, 1979, at 67.
80 Pub. L. No. 96-72 §§ 10(d), 10(f), 93 Stat. 503, 526-27 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2409).
81 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 10(f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 526 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2409).
82 Initial proposals to revise the list were to be submitted by June 2, 1978, and counter proposals by August 18, 1978. Formal negotiations began on October 2, 1978, and were scheduled to be
completed by August 2, 1979. The new control list was scheduled to become effective in the fall of
1979, although some predictions estimate that completion of the list may take two years. AviATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 9, 1978, at 57. The status of the list revision had not been
publicized as of the date of publication.
United States proposals seek both to tighten, particularly with regard to computers, and to
liberalize controls. Id. Japan is seeking to relax restrictions on 53 of 150 Japanese-made products,
mainly electronics goods. The U.S. and Great Britain are seeking liberalization of 50 items each,
but also are calling for tighter controls on others. France and West Germany are seeking relaxation on more than 15 items. Some estimates place the number of goods controlled by COCOM as
high as 200. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1978, at 15, col. 1; Bus. WEEK, June 18, 1979, at 75.
The United States submitted original proposals covering 79 items, including 16 proposals for
new entries. Export Licensing: COCOMf List Review Proposals of the United States: Hearing
Before the Subcomnm. On InternationalEconomic Policy andTrade ofthe House Coma on InternationalRelations,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978). For a discussion of U.S. House procedures for
submitting proposals and the difficulties encountered, see id. at 75-76, 84-91. See also Export
Controls,supra note 36, at 23-27; HouseHearings, supra note 3, at 1137-42 (Report by the Dep't
of Commerce, Review of Unilateral and Multilateral Export Control Lists, pursuant to § 118 of
the Export Administration Amendments of 1977).
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ical technologies approach adopted in the 1979 Act. The critical tech-

nologies approach, developed in 1976 by the Task Force on Export of
U.S. Technology, shifts the attention from products to technological
"know-how."8 3 In accordance with these recommendations, the 1979
Act delegates the primary responsibility for developing a list of militarily critical technologies to the Secretary of Defense.8 4 Incorporation in
the COCOM list could not be expected to occur until future list revisions ensue.8 5
EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE

1979

ACT

More than any of its predecessors, the 1979 Act recognizes the impact of foreign availability upon United States export control. The Act
requires a more thorough appraisal of the foreign availability of comparable goods and technologies in the export licensing process and the

initiation of negotiations with foreign governments for the control and
reduction of such availability.
First, the Act more clearly delineates the role of the different government agencies and the President with regard to foreign availability
determinations within the export licensing process. Despite contrary
proposals, Congress specifically places the authority to exercise na-

tional security controls, including foreign availability determinations,
within the Department of Commerce.8 6 Thus, except where otherwise
provided by the Act, the Secretaries of Defense and State and other

appropriate government officials are limited to a consultative and advisory capacity.87
83 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, AN ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROL OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY-A
PERSPECTIVE,

A

DOD

REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON EXPORT OF U.S.

TECHNOLOGY (1976); Dep'I of Defense Policy Statement on Export Controlof UnitedStates Technology: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomicPolicy and Trade ofthe House
Comm. on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., IstSess. 4-5 (1977) (statement of Ellen J. Frost,
Deputy Ass't See'y of Int'l Economic Affairs).
84 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(d)(2), 93 Stat. 503, 508 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §
2404). This list is intended to place primary emphasis on: arrays of design and manufacturing
know-how; keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment; and goods accompanied by
sophisticated operation, application, or maintenance know-how. Id. at § 5(d)(2)(A). See also
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 401-15 (statement of Ruth M. Davis, Deputy Under See'y for
Research and Advanced Technology, Dep't of Defense).
85 Elmer B. Staats, the Comptroller General, stated: "The credibility of the export control
program may very well hinge on whether or not a revised list truly reflects the complete relationship between products, technology and calculation of their military significance." Export Control
Oversight,supra note 75, at 9. See also House Hearings,supra note 3, at 156 (statement of Ellen J.
Frost, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Int'l Economic Affairs, Dep't of Defense).
86 See H.R. 3216, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H1643 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1979).
87 Section 5(d), for example, grants the Secretary of Defense primary responsibility for developing a list of militarily critical technologies. Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(d), 93 Stat. 503, 508 (1979) (to
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Furthermore, the 1979 Act, at least minimally, limits Presidential
authority by prohibiting the President from transferring his authority to
other governmental entities in order to overrule or modify any recommendations or decisions made by the Secretaries of Commerce,
Denfense, or State pursuant to the Act.88 The President, however, retains the final authority to impose export controls, regardless of foreign
availability, based upon national seciurity concerns.8 9 Arguably, the
presidential veto power under the guise of national security impairs, if
not nullifies, the effectiveness of foreign availability determinations required by the new Act. Nonetheless, presidential flexibility may be
necessary to protect national security in light of rapidly changing international events.
In addition, the Act authorizes one entity, the Office of Export Administration in the Department of Commerce, to monitor foreign availability.9 0 This centralization of authority may eliminate case by case
evaluations, 9 1 provide greater consistency in determinations, and reduce duplication by different agencies. 92 Furthermore, centralized administration of technical advisory committee investigations, verifiable
by the Secretary, may enhance the thoroughness of foreign availability
determinations.
The 1979 Act requires a thorough factual determination of foreign
availability in order to eliminate export controls, 93 although comparable foreign availability is often difficult to factually determine even
through COCOM mechanisms. 94 The Act, however, expressly authorizes the Secretary to establish procedure and criteria by which foreign
availability is to be determined. 95 Thus, the Secretary's development
and interpretation of the criteria and his assessment of the reliability
be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404). Also, § 5(k) authorizes the Secretary of State to conduct
negotiations with countries with which the United States has defense treaty commitments to restrict exports of goods and technologies. Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(k), 93 Stat. 503, 512 (1979) (to be
codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404).
88 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 4(e), 93 Stat. 503, 506 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403).
89 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §

2404).
90 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(0(5), 93 Stat. 503, 510 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §

2404).

91 H.R. REP. No. 200, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1979).
92 S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
93 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §

2404).
94 See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 623 (statement of Frank A. Well, Ass't Sec'y for Industry and Trade, Dep't of Commerce). See also note 105 infra (discussion of Cyril Bath Company
stretch forming presses).
95 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §

2404).
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and sufficiency of the evidence may determine the impact of foreign
availability concerns within the export licensing process. If availability
and comparability are strictly construed, fewer findings of foreign
availability will be reached and fewer additional licenses will be
granted to United States businesses. If these standards are loosely construed and more licenses are granted, national security objectives may
be undermined.96 Furthermore, the Act requires an additional deteruination of foreign availability to eliminate validated controls following an initial determination in response to a particular export license
application. 97 Thus, the strict and thorough assessments required for
foreign availability determinations, particularly in light of the difficulties in ascertaining foreign availability, are unlikely to translate into
substantial economic gains for United States business in international
trade.
Ultimately, the control and reduction of foreign availability
through negotiations with appropriate foreign governments will determine the effectiveness of United States export control. Toward these
objectives, the 1979 Act directs the President to initiate negotiations
with appropriate foreign countries when United States export controls
are imposed notwithstanding foreign availability. 98 Nonetheless, the

Act premises negotiations to reduce future foreign availability upon
presidential perception of their success. 99 The Act thereby falls short of
assuring steps toward the control of foreign availability before United
States business is unduly restricted.
Finally, by directing the President to enter into negotiations with
COCOM member countries, the 1979 Act recognizes the need to
achieve greater consensus in a multilateral forum. The success of these
negotiations, however, largely will be determined by the member countries' willingness to participate in negotiations and to implement any
resultant agreements. COCOM decisions are not binding on its member countries; moreover, COCOM lacks a formal agreement and has no
enforcement powers. COCOM participation by other countries is frequently informal and, in some cases, not officially recognized, primarily due to domestic political considerations. 1" COCOM actions,
96 See Export Controls, supra note 36, at 5. See also AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 10,
1979, at 65.
97 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(2), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §

2404).
98 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(f)(4), 93 Stat. 503, 510 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §

2404).
99 Id.
100 Bingham & Johnson, supra note 2, at 904.
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therefore, are effective only to the extent that they are executed by
member governments through their national export control pro10
grams. '

In addition, the secrecy surrounding COCOM and the COCOM
agreements may inhibit the success of any negotiations. COCOM embargo lists and procedures for their development are secret. This secrecy is designed both to protect national security interests and to
prevent political repercussions within participating countries.' 0 2 It is
unlikely, therefore, that COCOM members will agree to publish
COCOM agreements.
Furthermore, the success of COCOM and the negotiations will depend upon how United States participation is perceived and to what
extent it is desired by COCOM members. The United States continually has imposed its desire for stricter controls on COCOM countries,
thus preventing them from subordinating United States security to
their own international trade interests. COCOM countries have criticized the United States for being insensitive to their political and economic needs.10 3 These countries lack large domestic markets and tend
to view trade "as part of their national security and not something
apart from it.""0 4 In addition, the United States has unduly relied on
foreign availability, to the detriment of United
COCOM to control
05
States business.'
101 EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 36, at 9.
102 Commentators have noted: "Some European governments are sensitive to criticism from
the Left for participating with the United States in anti-communist trade controls, and our own
government is sensitive to charges that it quietly acquiesces in loose European and Japanese enforcement of controls." Bingham & Johnson, supra note 2, at 904.
103 EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 36, at 9.
104 Id. COCOM countries, unrestricted by extensive lists, have become major suppliers of advanced technology to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Between 1963 and 1968, alone, Western European countries signed contracts for delivery of an estimated 100 complete industrial

plants, including installation and training, to the Soviet Union. VA. Note, supra note 28, at 10203. By 1976, COCOM trade in manufactured goods with communist countries reached about
$19.6 billion, $2.9 billion more than these countries had received during the Marshall Plan years.
EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 36, at 8. Japan and European NATO countries have exported
advanced electronics, communications and transport equipment, and other items still embargoed
for export to communist nations by the United States. HousE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., IST SFSS., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 578 (Comm.

Print 1977).
The United States was the predominant source of advanced technology in the West when
export controls were first applied. The capabilities of Western European nations to export technology and goods have increased dramatically. As a result, these nations have exerted pressure to
reduce the international embargo list and generally, have reduced their control of these goods.
See GIFFIN, THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION 91-94
(rev. ed. 1971).
105 United States companies have contended that they are being denied permission to export to
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The United States, therefore, must reconcile its international trade
policy with the political and economic needs of COCOM members to
assure greater multilateral cooperation. First, the United States must
continuously appraise foreign availability with the goal of reducing
controls on available goods and technologies. Second, the stated objectives of the COCOM negotiations, including the reduction of export
controls to an internationally acceptable level and the development of
effective enforcement procedures,. must be achieved at the very least to
maintain a viable multilateral framework. Efforts to formalize

COCOM through the establishment of a treaty may threaten already
strained relations between the United States and other COCOM coun06
tries. 1
The 1979 Act, however, fails to adopt United States licensing procedures suitable to COCOM participation. The establishment of a 180-

day maximum time limit for processing export applications will benefit
U.S. trade only to the extent that the goods are not subject to the delays
of United States re-export licensing procedures. By failing to eliminate
re-export licensing, the Act continues to disadvantage United States
trade vis-A-vis foreign competitors.

Furthermore, the sixty-day time limit for processing exception recommunist countries advanced technology that is freely available from other foreign sources and,
frequently, COCOM members. A classic case history involves the Cyril Bath Company stretch
forming presses. In 1976, Cyril, a U.S. manufacturer of machine tools specializing in metal forming machinery, sought to export stretch forming presses, generally used to manufacture aircraft
bodies, to the Soviet Union. Despite proof that a French manufacturer had exported, and had a
contract to continue exporting, stretch forming presses to the Soviet Union, the U.S. denied Cyril's
export license, based on the COCOM agreement. The French government, however, had denied
any knowledge of past or present shipments of stretch forming presses to the Soviet Union. Following congressional hearings, the United States reversed its position based on foreign availability
of the machinery from France. The United States submitted the case to COCOM as an exception
request.
The French government has since admitted that they manufacture the machinery for automotive and aeronautical uses. Furthermore, there are indications that the French machines have
been shipped without COCOM review. Nonetheless, COCOM has refused to accede to the U.S.
request as long as the French government denies shipping comparable machinery. For a discussion of the Cyril Bath Company stretch forming presses case, see Export Licensing: Foreign.4vailabily
O , of Stretch FormingPresses. HearingBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy
and Trade of the House Comm on InternationalRelations, PartI, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Furthermore, the United States continues to rely upon COCOM countries to enforce export
controls. Rauer H. Meyer, Director, Office of Export Administration, Dep't of Commerce, stated:
"As a matter of practice, if comparable equipment is produced in COCOM countries and the
equipment is subject to COCOM embargo controls, then we conclude that equipment is not available in an unrestricted way." Id. at 31. See also Bingham & Johnson, supra note 2, at 905-07.
106 See House Hearings,supra note 3, at 647 (statement of William A. Root, Director, Office of
East-West Trade, Dep't of State). For a contrary view, see id. at 222 (statement of James Gray,
President, National Machine Tool Builders' Association).
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quests results in further delays for those domestic producers who are
also required to submit to multilateral review. This, once again, adversely affects domestic exporters by imposing delays that are not incurred by their foreign competitors and not adaptable to COCOM
review deadlines. Moreover, domestic exporters may be subject to additional sixty-day delay periods if the executive branch rules that the
desired exports, if allowed, are likely to jeopardize national security.
Even more important, however, is the fact that the new Act fails to
include any provision for expeditious review of the other countries' exception requests that are subject to multilateral review. Therefore,
even with a new comprehensive export act, the United States has failed
to provide a system for review of domestic and foreign exports that
meets COCOM deadlines for processing exception requests.
CONCLUSION

Since the enactment of postwar export controls over advanced
goods and technologies to non-allied nations, Congress has attempted
to reconcile the conflicting objectives of protecting national security
and promoting United States international trade. The increasing availability of comparable goods and technologies from foreign sources to
communist countries undermined both these objectives. Furthermore,
prior legislation inadequately appraised the impact of foreign availability on national security controls, thus unduly restricting United States
trade.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 more effectively recognizes the impact of foreign availability on national security controls.
First, the Act provides for more centralized and comprehensive determinations of foreign availability within the export licensing process.
Second, and more importantly, the Act takes significant steps toward
controlling and reducing foreign availability through negotiations with
foreign countries, particularly within the COCOM forum. Nonetheless, the Act fails to effectively reconcile United States international
trade policies and, more specifically, United States licensing procedures
with COCOM objectives and methods of control. Until the United
States improves its participation within the COCOM forum, effective
multilateral controls cannot be attained.
Shirley Miller Dvorin

